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1 Philip Huang set up a Los Angeles-based study group to examine Chinese law, and has
created a collection with Stanford University Press, this being the sixth volume. This
book is also the second part of an intended trilogy. Following his study on Qing civil law
(Civil  Justice in China,  Representation and Practice in the Qing,  1996),  he had planned to
produce a volume on the Republican period, but found it more informative to present
Republican civil law in contrast to that of the preceding period. This book is thus a new
contribution to the history of Chinese law by an eminent authority in this field. But, by
virtue of the book’s comparative approach, it also amounts to a study on the political
and social changes that took place during the first half of the twentieth century from a
legal  perspective,  a  viewpoint  that  is  often  neglected  by  historians,  undoubtedly
because it is generally regarded as too “technical”. 
2 The book is  presented in  two parts—the first,  the  shorter  of  the  two,  retraces  the
history of the code and the legal institutions from 1900-45. It recounts the work of the
legal reform commissions during the decade from 1900 to 1910, which gave rise to new
codes, both civil and penal, inspired notably by the German model. However, the draft
civil code was never adopted, and a revised version based on the “civil” parts extracted
from the Qing code remained in use until the promulgation of the civil code drawn up
by  the  Kuomintang  government  in  1929-1930.  Procedural  reforms  were,  however,
gradually applied from the latter years of the Qing period—separation of penal and civil
law (which represented only “minor” matters in the Qing code and became a separate
area), separation of the judiciary and the executive within the local administration, and
the  emergence  of  the  legal profession.  These  developments  in  legal  practices  thus
facilitated, not followed, the adoption of a law that was radically different from the
Qing code. The second part of the book examines the similarities and the differences
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between Qing law and Republican law, in terms of the legal texts as well as the practices
(through a  sample  of  cases  drawn from local  archives),  by means of  five  questions
relating essentially to civil law—the conditional sale of land (dian), ownership of the
topsoil (dual ownership of agricultural land), debts, support given to elderly parents,
and family law as it applies to women (marriage, adultery and divorce). Philip Huang’s
writing style is clear and his arguments are well-constructed. It is a great credit to him
that he has made such a subject intelligible to non-specialists, such as this reviewer.
3 On each point, the author endeavours to bring to the fore the “logic” (the ideological
foundations) of the two codes, the practices of the judges, and “custom” (in fact, here,
simply the practices common among the people). Sometimes the codes try to follow
“custom”, sometimes they rebuff it. On the whole, the contrast between the Qing and
the 1929-30 codes appears larger than that between the real-life cases found in the
archives from the Qing and Republican periods. In both kinds of archives, we find very
similar issues, stemming from a popular practice that changed only slowly. Republican
judges often tried to find compromises between the radically new logic of the 1929-30
code  and  traditional  attitudes.  Maybe  this  was  because  the  code  had  unexpected
consequences, maybe because the code itself retained traces of the paternalistic Qing
ideology, or maybe simply because the judges still broadly shared the ancient “logic”.
But changes in the code as well as in jurisprudence moved along similar lines. Philip
Huang sums up this evolution in two breaks: 1)  from an agricultural  economy to a
capitalist economy (the former supporting a farmer’s rights to his land and protecting
him from usury and dispossession,  and the latter recognising individual ownership,
capital  and  investment);  and  2)  from a  patriarchal  law  to  an  individualistic  law,
implying gender  equality,  marriage as  a  contract  between two individuals,  and the
right of women to self-determination.
4 Without political prejudice, Philip Huang wants to highlight all the positive aspects of
the Kuomintang legal undertaking by demonstrating the advances (women’s rights and
a market economy) made possible by the new code as well as the legal practices that go
with it. One might wonder if the examples chosen are representative of the Republican
laws  as  a  whole.  Property  law  and  the  status  of  women  are  areas  in  which  the
Kuomintang had a genuine, positive,  modernistic agenda. In a different area, which
borders on civil law (which interests this reviewer), i.e. the law relating to temples and
the clergy, the evolution is quite different.  Admittedly,  there too we move from an
absolutist model (under the Qing, the emperor was the only religious authority, and
could declare a cult illicit and ban it), to another ruled exclusively by law. However, by
its  anti-religious  laws,  the  Nanking  government  practiced  theology  and  arbitrarily
sorted, under cover of scientific justification, the cults which it authorised and those
that had to be banned. The laws relating to temples (notably those of 1915 and 1928)
also marked a greater interference by the state in an essentially private area and new
prerogatives for the local authorities, who, notably, allowed themselves to seize land
from  religious  foundations,  as  well  as  to  deny  the  existence  of  certain  types  of
organisations (temple corporations) which, although they were not formally protected
by Qing law, were recognised in practice by the magistrates.
5 In short, Philip Huang’s book paints a picture of the changes introduced by a code that
stemmed  from  an  imported  ideology  (free-market  capitalism,  giving  priority  to
contracts between individuals as a source of social relationships).  The adaptation of
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this ideology in the Chinese context is thus reflected in a mixed evolution in terms of
liberties, increasing certain ones only to cut back on others.
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